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Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable
Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner*
Internet service providers are today largely immune from liability for their role in the
creation and propagation of worms, viruses, and other forms of malicious computer
code. In this Essay, we question that state of affairs. Our purpose is not to weigh in on
the details—for example, whether liability should sound in negligence or strict liability,
or whether liability is in this instance best implemented by statute or via gradual
common law development. Rather, our aim is to challenge the recent trend in the courts
and Congress away from liability and toward complete immunity for Internet service
providers. In our view, such immunity is difficult to defend on policy grounds, and
sharply inconsistent with conventional tort law principles. Internet service providers
control the gateway through which Internet pests enter and reenter the public computer
system. They should therefore bear some responsibility for stopping these pests before
they spread and for helping to identify individuals who originate malicious code in the
first place.

Computer viruses and related strains of Internet contagion impose a significant cost
on the many individuals and entities that rely on Internet access for commerce, research,
and communication. The United States government has responded to this problem with
efforts to identify and deter those who create and propagate Internet pests. Thus, for
example, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Homeland
Security allocate substantial resources to the battle against cyber-crime; and Congress has
passed a number of criminal statutes designed to target the deviants who create Internet
viruses and other forms of malicious computer code.1 Government efforts along these
lines have been augmented by the actions of private parties as well. Microsoft, for
example, has offered cash rewards for any information leading to the arrest and
conviction of those responsible for particularly disruptive Internet attacks;2 and many
computer hobbyists volunteer their talents to the project of tracing the sources of Internet
mischief.
*
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1
See, for example, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C); and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub. L.
No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (Oct. 12, 1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §1030 (2002)).
2
Bob Keefe, Microsoft beefs up security initiatives, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (Feb 25, 2004) at 3C.

These tactics obviously have the potential to reduce the total amount of harm
caused by cyber-insecurity; however, we doubt that direct intervention aimed at
perpetrators of Internet mischief can be a sufficient response. Our concern is that the
perpetrators of cyber-crime are too often beyond the effective reach of law, both because
these individuals are almost impossible to track, and because, even when identified, these
individuals usually lack the resources necessary to pay for the damage they cause. Thus,
in this Essay, we join a growing chorus of legal commentators3 in arguing that these
attempts at direct intervention must be supplemented by a legal rule that brings Internet
service providers (ISPs) into the chain of responsibility. Specifically, ISPs should to some
degree be held accountable when their subscribers either originate malicious Internet
code, or propagate that code by, for example, forwarding a virus over email or adopting
lax security precautions that in turn allow a computer to be co-opted by a malevolent
user.
This might sound harsh. But rules that hold one party liable for the wrongs
committed by another are the standard legal response in situations where, as here,
liability will be predictably ineffective if directly applied to a class of bad actors, and yet
there exists a class of related parties capable of either controlling those bad actors or
mitigating the damage they cause. Phrased another way, while indirect liability comes in
a wide variety of flavors and forms—strict liability and negligence; explicit statutory
provisions and also more flexible common law standards; and so on—it is the norm, and
we do not see any reason why legal rules associated with cyber-security should be an
exception to the pattern of rules that govern structurally identical interactions throughout
the offline world.
Our position runs counter to recent legal trends. In section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, for example, Congress announced that a provider
of “interactive computer service” is not to be treated as “the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider,”4 in many ways
3

See, for example, Brian McManus, Rethinking Defamation Liability for Internet Service Providers, 35
Suffolk U. L. Rev. 647 (2001) (advocating a return to common law standards for liability in the context of
defamation law); Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 901 (2002)
(articulating an intricate liability regime for a variety of online wrongs).
4
47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1).
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immunizing Internet service providers from liability for defamatory content that is
provided by business partners or customers but disseminated by the service itself.
Similarly, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 sharply limits a service
provider’s liability for copyright infringement in cases where the service provider merely
acts as a conduit for the incriminating material;5 and that statute more broadly limits
liability in instances where the service provider did not know about the infringing
activity, was not aware of facts or circumstances from which the activity is apparent, did
not receive a direct financial benefit from the infringement, and acts in accordance with
statutory guidelines to expeditiously disable access to the material in question.6 Courts
interpreting these provisions have reinforced this apparent trend away from ISP liability
by, among other things, interpreting these statutes to preempt state laws that would
otherwise have encouraged ISPs to take due care.7
Then again, maybe these trends are not as one-sided as they at first appear. Our
argument in favor of service provider liability is primarily based on the notion that
Internet service providers are in a good position to reduce the number and severity of bad
acts online; and that intuition finds support even within the aforementioned immunity and
safe harbor statutes.8 So, for example, while the Communications Decency Act does
remove the specter of indirect liability for the transmission of indecent or defamatory
content, the act also encourages Internet service providers to address inappropriate
content through voluntary private action. To that end, one provision immunizes service
providers from liability for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,

5

17 U.S.C. §512(a).
17 U.S.C. §512(c)-(d).
7
We discuss and criticize several of these cases in Part V.
8
The Communications Decency Act is an immunity provision in that it waives off liability for a certain
class of actions without explicitly making that immunity contingent on particular precautions. The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, by contrast, is a safe harbor provision, in that it creates immunity but only for
entities that take specific precautionary steps. Interestingly, some commentators have suggested that the
Communications Decency Act should be read as a safe harbor provision, with its immunity applying only
where the relevant service provider has itself attempted to block indecent or otherwise inappropriate
communications. See Matthew Schruers, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party
Content, 88 Va. L. Rev. 206, 217 n.61 (2002). No court has yet adopted that view, although it is attractive
on policy grounds and seems consistent with both the language of the act and its structure. See Doe v. GTE
Corp, 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing interpretations of section 230 immunity that would
nevertheless encourage filtering by ISPs.)
6
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lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or
not such material is constitutionally protected.”9 On this same theme, not only is much of
the immunity available under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act contingent on a
service provider’s efforts to quickly remove content plausibly associated with
infringement, but also, like the Communications Decency Act, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act protects service providers from “any claim based on the service provider’s
good faith disabling of access to, or removal of, material or activity claimed to be
infringing or based on facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,
regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately determined to be infringing.”10
In any event, ours is not an argument about the state of the positive law nor an
attempt to divine Congressional intent. Our point is simply that, faced with the growing
problem of cyber-insecurity, ISPs should be called into the service of the law. Much as
the threat of liability puts pressure on the owners of bars and restaurants to watch for any
copyright infringement that might take place within their establishments;11 and the
common law principle of vicarious liability obligates employers to monitor, train, and
otherwise exercise control over the behavior of their employees;12 common law tort
liability or more carefully tailored federal statutes should be used to encourage Internet
service providers to do their part in responding to Internet worms, viruses, denial of
service attacks, and the like. Service providers control the gateway through which
Internet pests enter and reenter the system. As such, service providers can help to stop
these pests before they spread and to identify the individuals who originate them in the
first place. ISPs should be required by law to engage in these precautions.
We anticipate two primary objections. The first—and a concern that is repeated
throughout the literature—is that liability will cause Internet service providers to
overreact. As Neal Katyal puts the point, “Because an ISP derives little utility from
providing access to a risky subscriber, a legal regime that places liability on an ISP for

9

47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2)(A).
17 U.S.C. §512(g)(1).
11
See, for example, Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (hotel owner can be held liable when
copyrighted work is performed at the hotel without permission).
12
See Restatement (Second) of Agency §216.
10
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the acts of its subscribers will quickly lead the ISP to purge risky ones from its system.”13
Assaf Hamdani similarly worries that ISPs will inefficiently exclude some users because
“ISPs do not capture the full value of the conduct they are entrusted with policing.”14
These arguments are in our view misstated, as in every market where goods are sold at or
near marginal cost the relevant seller “derives little utility” from the sale; and in every
market where the market price is less than the customer’s willingness to pay the relevant
seller “does not capture the full value” of the buyer’s purchase. The problem with respect
to Internet access is not that the ISPs do not capture the full value of the sale, but that
subscribers create positive externalities enjoyed by advertisers, information providers,
merchants, friends, and acquaintances, and thus subscriber willingness to pay understates
the social value created when a new subscriber comes online.15 Reframed this way, it
becomes clear that this is a standard problem—in many markets there are substantial
positive externalities—and that the right response is not a reduction in the incentive to
take care. Restaurants, after all, create positive externalities by drawing crowds that in
turn patronize neighboring businesses and stimulate the local economy, yet no one
suggests that in response local authorities should stop enforcing the health code; that
response would just drive customers away. For similar reasons, a reduction in ISP

13

Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007–08 (2001). Katyal
does not in the end oppose liability for Internet service providers. As he writes later in the article, his point
“is not to suggest that third-party deterrence is always inappropriate, but simply to caution that there are
tough calculations to work out.” Id. at 1098.
14
Hamdani, cited in note 3, at 918. Other scholars, and indeed some courts, have raised similar concerns.
See, for example, Neil Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing, 17 Harv. J. L & Tech. 1, at 13 n.30 (2003) (“ISPs do not fully share the benefits its subscribers
derive from placing material, whether infringing or non-infringing, on the network. As a result, imposing
liability on ISPs for subscribers' infringing material induces ISPs to overdeter, purging any material that a
copyright holder claims is infringing.”); Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997)
(“Because service providers would be subject to liability only for the publication of information, and not
for its removal, they would have a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon [accusation], whether
the contents were defamatory or not.”).
15
We are not just splitting hairs. For example, because of the way he phrases the problem, Hamdani
wrongly concludes that there is no problem with overzealous enforcement in cases where the subscriber
uses in-house equipment rather purchasing access in the competitive market. In such a case, subscriber
benefits are fully internalized by the ISP (which satisfies Hamdani) and yet the mismatch between private
and social benefits remains. See Hamdani, cited in note 14, at 918-20. More generally, by framing the
problem as they do, Katyal and Hamdani leave their arguments open to a simple response: ISPs should
raise prices and in that way capture a larger share of subscriber utility. This is surely not what Katyal and
Hamdani have in mind, and the reason is that they, like us, are actually worried about the problem of
positive externalities.
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liability is unattractive. The right response is a tax break or other subsidy that encourages
marginal subscribers to stay online even as the costs of service rise.
The second concern echoes in the preamble to section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, where Congress notes that immunizing Internet service providers from
liability will have the indirect effect of encouraging “the development of technologies
which maximize user control over what information is received”16 and also “the
development and utilization of blocking and filtering techniques”17 that similarly might
empower Internet subscribers to bar unwanted messages. The objection is that allowing
Internet service providers to shirk will increase the incentive for subscribers to engage in
self-defense and, through that, the incentive for independent firms to step in and offer
technological solutions along the lines of virus protection software and firewalls. That is
all true; but, as we will argue below, the logical implication is not complete immunity for
Internet service providers. Instead, liability should be tailored in light of this possibility
for market-based self-help, the goal being to encourage service providers to adopt the
precautions that they can provide most efficiently, while leaving any remaining
precautions to other market actors. This is again a standard scenario. Pedestrians can
exercise care in crossing the street and otherwise interacting with fast-moving vehicles,
and, indeed, by remaining at home or by wearing unfashionably bright attire, a pedestrian
can sharply reduce the chance of being injured. Yet these simple facts do not lead anyone
to suggest that automobile drivers should be immune from tort liability. Instead, rules of
comparative and contributory negligence tailor the liability imposed on drivers in ways
that encourage pedestrians to also take precautions. The same basic analysis applies here.
Now a word on our terminology. We do not need a formal definition of the term
“Internet service provider” in order to capture the basic idea that these are the entities that
provide individual and institutional subscribers with access to the Internet. The precise
features associated with that access are not of concern. Some ISPs offer email services,
news, storage space, and even games to their subscribers. Others simply receive data,
convert that data into a form consistent with the TCP/IP protocol, and forward the results
to independent computers that then provide richer services and interactions. All of these
16
17

47 U.S.C. §230(b)(3).
47 U.S.C. §230(b)(4).
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entities, however, are for our purposes considered “Internet service providers” in that
each controls the point at which information residing on a privately owned computer
network first comes in contact with the public network. Thus—and perhaps these will
quickly sound to readers like historical references, given the pace of change in the
industry—SBC is an Internet service provider in our vernacular, as is America Online,
Road Runner, and RCN.
We similarly see no need to rely on technical definitions for concepts like the
computer worm, the computer virus, the denial of service attack, or even the software
Trojan horse. These references for us serve as placeholders for any category of malicious
computer code that is propagated on the Internet, using or interfering with privately
owned computer equipment, and done in a way such that the relevant private party has
not given informed consent for that use or interference. Details beyond that—while
certainly relevant to an understanding of the specific steps that might be available to
combat pests—have no impact on the legal argument we present.
Our discussion proceeds in five parts. Part I summarizes the conventional economic
account of indirect liability and applies those teachings to the specific case of Internet
service providers. Part II considers in more detail the two primary objections sketched
above, namely: the concern that liable ISPs will be overly cautious and thus inefficiently
exclude marginal subscribers; and the concern that liability will reduce user incentives to
engage in efficient self-help. Part III questions several recent court decisions that seem
unnecessarily reluctant to hold ISPs accountable for the bad acts of their subscribers.
Finally, Part IV concludes with some remarks on the limitations of our analysis and how
our discussion differs from what might otherwise be a comparable discussion of ISP
liability in the context of online copyright infringement.
I. The Theory of Indirect Liability
A. The Standard Model
Indirect liability is said to attach in instances where the law holds one party liable
for wrongs committed by another.18 A familiar setting is the employment relationship,
18

The terminology used for this concept varies considerably in the literature. Economists seem to prefer the
phrase “vicarious liability” even though, in copyright law at least, vicarious liability is merely one specific
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where an employer can be held liable for torts committed on the job by his employee.19
But other examples abound. Bars are sometimes held liable when bartenders serve
alcoholic beverages to patrons who later harm others while driving under the influence.20
A motor vehicle owner can be held liable for the torts committed by a driver to whom the
owner loaned his car.21 Landlords can be held liable if they take inadequate precautions
against criminal activity that harms tenants.22 Entrepreneurs may be held liable if
criminals use their premises to sell counterfeit or gray market goods.23 Even products
liability law has this same basic structure: a buyer may use a dangerous product such as a
car in a negligent manner and cause injury to a third party; if the victim can show that the
accident would not have occurred had the manufacturer used a better design, the victim
may be able to recover from the manufacturer instead of, or in addition to, the buyer.24
Conventional economic analysis suggests that an explicit rule imposing indirect
liability is not necessary when two conditions are simultaneously met: first, the direct bad
actors are subject to the effective reach of the law, by which we mean that the employees,
criminals, and purchasers in our previous examples are easy to identify and have assets
that are sufficient to pay for any harm caused; and, second, transaction costs are such that
those direct bad actors can use contract law to shift responsibility in whole or in part from

type of indirect liability, namely liability that attaches because the third party has control over the direct
bad actor and also benefits from the bad acts in question. See Douglas Lichtman & William Landes,
Indirect Liability in Copyright: An Economic Perspective, 16 Harv. J. Law & Tech 395, 396-99 (2003).
Other commentators use phrases like “secondary liability” or “third-party liability” to capture the intuition
that this is liability that attaches not to the bad actor directly, but to some other related party. In any event,
for current purposes, we use the term “indirect liability” as our generic phrase.
19
See cases cited in note 12.
20
North Dakota’s dram shop statute, for example, provides that any person “injured by any obviously
intoxicated person has a claim for relief . . . against any person who knowingly disposes, sells, barters, or
gives away alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, an incompetent, or an obviously
intoxicated person.” D. Cent. Code 5-01-06.1. Arizona law, by contrast, immunizes from liability parties
who merely furnish or serve “spirituous liquor to a person of the legal drinking age.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
4-301, 4-311 to -312 (West 1995);
21
Usually as a matter of statute. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 934 (2000).
22
See, for example, Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 796 P.2d 506 (Idaho 1990).
23
See, for example, Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
24
See Restatement (Third) of Products Liability, §402A. We could go on with a variety of other examples.
Perhaps most eerily similar to our current topic: a physician can be held liable for failing to warn a patient’s
spouse that the patient is carrying, and thus might expose the spouse, to a real-world ailment like Rocky
Mountain Spotted Fever. See Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993) (physician had, and failed
to fulfill, a duty to warn patient’s wife of one such health risk).
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themselves to any party that might otherwise be an attractive target for indirect liability.25
The intuition is that, when these conditions are satisfied, the various parties can create
indirect liability by contract, and—albeit subject to some second-order constraints26—
will do so where that would be efficient.27
To see this, consider the employment setting in more detail. If the driver of a
delivery van is himself as easy to identify as the retailer for whom he works, and, further,
the driver has adequate resources to pay for any harm he might cause in the event of an
accident, then there is no strong argument for imposing liability on the retailer. No matter
what the legal rule, the driver and the retailer will efficiently allocate liability through
their employment contract. Thus, if the optimal rule would impose on the retailer the
obligation to inspect every delivery van each morning, or to test employees randomly for
drug and alcohol abuse, the driver and retailer will agree by contract to those desired
monitoring activities. Similarly, to the extent that driving the truck poses an unavoidable
risk of injury to others, the driver will either shift that risk to the employer through an
indemnity clause, or himself assume that risk and demand higher wages in compensation.
The legal rule in this situation is just a default; where transaction costs are low and
employees have adequate resources, contracts allow private parties to shift and divide
legal responsibility as they see fit.
Things change when either of the conditions identified above fails to hold. For
instance, in a situation where contracts are easily negotiated between the driver and the
retailer, but the driver himself lacks the resources necessary to pay for the harm he might
cause, the absence of indirect liability would tempt the retailer to leave tort liability on
the shoulders of the driver, in essence using the driver’s lack of resources as a cap on any
ultimate damage payment. In a situation where contracts are possible but a negligent
employee’s identity cannot be ascertained—for example, witnesses report that a Federal
25

For a general introduction, see Alan Sykes, Vicarious Liability, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law 673 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
26
Among these constraints are the costs a victim would incur to identify and then sue the liable parties, and
cognitive limitations that might lead small parties to incorrectly predict the likelihood or extent of any
expected accidents.
27
We assume that the indirectly liable parties are subject to the effective reach of the law, which is to say
that we assume they can be identified and they have sufficient assets to pay for any harms they might
cause. While that is typically true, it is not always true, especially in instances where the harm in question
is catastrophic.
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Express van hit the pedestrian but no one saw the driver—again the absence of indirect
liability would act as a de facto cap on tort liability, putting the driver in a position where
he would not be fully liable for his accidents and thus leading the retailer and driver
together to take sub-optimal care. Where the driver has adequate resources but the parties
cannot contract effectively, the legal rule clearly matters as well, this time because the
inability to contract would make it impossible for the parties to shift responsibility to the
cheaper cost avoider.
Thus the interesting cases are those where either the relevant bad actors are beyond
the reach of the law, or transaction costs make reallocation by contract implausible. For
these cases, economic analysis identifies two additional factors: first, indirect liability
should be attractive in cases where the potentially liable party is in a good position to
detect or deter the relevant bad act; and, second, indirect liability should be attractive in
cases where it can encourage the liable party to internalize some significant negative
externality unavoidably associated with its activities.28
Start with the first factor, namely that indirect liability should be particularly
attractive where the potentially liable party is in a good position to detect and deter bad
acts. This is, for example, one of the main reasons why employers are held liable for the
torts committed by their employees. The employer can monitor employee behavior,
screen employees before entrusting them with dangerous equipment, develop
compensation schemes that encourage employees to exercise due care, and otherwise
beneficially influence employee decisions. The prospect of indirect liability pressures
employers to make use of these mechanisms and in that way to minimize the expected
cost of accidents. Now admittedly employer liability is typically strict, which is to say
that—despite what we just said—liability does not turn on whether the employer should
have taken additional precautions given the particular accident at issue. However, the
28

Our discussion follows the analysis in Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 170-75
(Harvard University Press 1987); Alan Sykes, An Efficiency Analysis Of Vicarious Liability Under the
Law of Agency, 91 Yale L. J. 168 (1981); Alan Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L. J.
1231 (1984); Alan Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1988); Reinier Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.Law & Econ 53 (1986). Two
helpful overviews are Sykes, cited in note 25, and Reinier Kraakman, Third Party Liability, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, 583 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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logic is likely that the more detailed inquiry would prove too cumbersome, and thus the
law errs on the side of holding employers accountable. In essence, strict liability in this
application presumes that there was something that the employer should have done
differently, and that presumption is made irrebuttable for reasons of administrative
convenience. In many other settings, by contrast, some form of a negligence standard is
used, and that maps well to the intuition that the liable party had the ability to control the
erstwhile bad actor and inefficiently failed to do so.29
Turn now to the second factor: that even in situations where the indirectly liable
party cannot meaningfully detect or deter bad acts, indirect liability might be attractive as
a means by which to force the accountable party to factor significant unavoidable
negative repercussions associated with its activities into its baseline decision of how
much to engage in those activities in the first place. Again, the employment setting is
instructive. Even when a retailer can do nothing more to ensure that the drivers of its
delivery vans take appropriate care, it is likely efficient to have the retailer pay at least
some fraction of the costs of any accidents that occur during the delivery process. The
reason is that this forces the retailer to account for the costs of accidents when deciding
the price and frequency of deliveries. If accidents are unavoidable, liability means that
price will rise and quantity will fall, which is exactly what should happen given this
negative externality. This is referred to in the literature as an effect on “activity level,”
the vocabulary there designed to emphasize that the purpose of liability on this argument
is not to encourage precautions, but instead to influence how often the harmful activity in
question takes place. Importantly, note that where activity level is the concern, strict
liability is often appropriate, in that the logic of liability is not at all tied to any negligent
failure on the part of the indirectly liable party to take some cost-justified precaution.
These factors—call them “control” and “activity level”—are neither alone nor
together sufficient to justify the imposition of an indirect liability rule. Instead, these are
merely prerequisites that help to identify cases where liability might be attractive. The
actual question of whether liability should be imposed typically turns on other, often
setting-specific considerations. Thus, while the telephone company surely has the ability
29

For example, Sharp, supra note 22; Fonovisa, supra note 23.
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to deter crank phone calls by more carefully monitoring calling patterns, it is unlikely that
telephone company liability would be attractive, both because of obvious privacy
concerns and because of worries that, in its attempts to address the problem of crank
calls, the telephone company would inadvertently interfere with a sizeable percentage of
legitimate telephone activity. To reject indirect liability in this situation is in essence to
announce that the costs of crank telephone calls are not sufficiently high as compared to
the costs of indirect prevention. Similarly, the mere fact that an airport provides a venue
from which airlines impose on neighbors a pollution and noise externality does not itself
justify imposing liability for that harm. After all, the neighbors are themselves making
decisions that increase and decrease the importance of these externalities; and, in a world
where the airport absorbed these costs in full, neighbors might inefficiently decide to use
their properties to raise livestock and care for the elderly, two uses that are so sensitive to
noise and pollution that they likely should be disfavored given the proximity of the
airport.
That said, the control and activity level factors do helpfully sketch the contours of
efficient indirect liability rules. For instance, these factors make clear why employers
should not typically be held accountable for torts committed by their employees in
instances where the employee was acting outside the scope of employment. The
employer has no special advantage when it comes to stopping its employees from abusing
their spouses or picking fights at bars.30 Moreover, neither of those activities is rightly
understood as a consequence of the employer engaging in whatever its core business
might be; whether the employer is in its current line of business or another, the employee
is probably just as likely to commit these bad acts. Thus, neither the control nor the
activity level rationale fits, and liability is inappropriate.31

30

The right question to ask is whether the employer can influence the relevant employee behavior more
effectively than can the state. Thus, while an employer can fine an employee for bad acts committed on the
employee’s own time, and while such a system could be used to discourage bar fights and spousal abuse,
the government can implement such a system of fines just as easily, and the government might even be
better suited to do so because, for example, the government has the ability to incarcerate bad actors for
whom the fine turns out to be an insufficient disincentive.
31
See Sykes, cited in note 25 (discussing employee torts outside the scope of employment). Note that there
might be more of a link here than we indicate above. An employer who places enormous stress on his
employee, for example, surely increases the likelihood that that employee will abuse his spouse or become
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Similarly, an efficient indirect liability regime should be reluctant to wave off
liability in cases where the potentially liable party asserts, as a defense, that he lacked
control over the alleged bad actor due to a contractual provision, an affirmative
technology choice, or some detail related to corporate structure. The idea behind the
control rationale is to encourage private parties to develop mechanisms, and adopt
organizational structures, that effectively allow for the control of possible bad actors.
Allowing parties to hide from this obligation through some voluntary limitation threatens
to undermine that logic, in essence encouraging a potentially liable party to knowingly
and intentionally stick its head in the sand. Sadly, courts accept these sorts of excuses all
too often—this is exactly the ruse at play in situations where taxi cab companies structure
their affairs such that each taxi is, in the eyes of the law, a separate corporate entity32—
but they should instead direct a skeptical eye toward any party’s self-imposed inability to
detect or deter.33
In sum, the conventional economic account makes clear that private parties cannot
create the optimal liability regime on their own in instances where the party directly
responsible for the bad act is beyond the effective reach of the law, and also in instances
where transaction costs make contract negotiations across the various relevant parties
implausible. The conventional economic rationale for indirect liability further stresses
that liability should be considered in instances where one party has the ability to deter or
detect the bad acts of another, and also where liability can serve to encourage a party to
internalize significant negative externalities associated with its activities. As we will
argue in the next section, violations of cyber-security take place in a setting where these
conditions all seem likely to hold.

involved in barroom brawls. Thus there might be at least a small activity level affect to consider, and
certain types of employers should perhaps bear liability for employee behavior that takes place after hours.
32
For a discussion, see Goldberg v. Lee Express Cab Corp., 634 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1995).
33
This is similarly a good reason for the Ninth Circuit to look askance at Grokster, the entity that
intentionally designed its peer-to-peer music trading system such that, once activated, the technology
(arguably) cannot effectively monitor for copyright infringement. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), appeal pending. On the general theme of intentional ignorance in
the context of indirect liability, see In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650-51 (7th Cir.
2003) (“a service provider that would otherwise be a contributory infringer does not obtain immunity by
using encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service is
being used”).
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B. Applied to Internet Service Providers
There are strong arguments for imposing liability on Internet service providers for
violations of cyber-security, and they track the four core intuitions we outline in the
previous section. Consider each in turn.
1. Actors beyond the Law’s Reach
The individuals who design and intentionally propagate malicious computer code
are typically far beyond the reach of conventional law. For one thing, they are hard to
identify. Sophisticated saboteurs use the Internet’s topology to conceal their tracks by
routing messages and information through a convoluted path that is difficult for
authorities to uncover. Moreover, by the time a computer virus or worm is detected, the
trail is often cold. This is true because Internet pests like worms and viruses are routinely
programmed to sit idle for a period of time before unveiling themselves. That allows
mischief-makers to time their attacks to coincide with important or ironic world
moments—the W32/Mypics virus was designed to trigger with the start of the new
millennium, for example34—but it also creates a period of time during which a
troublemaker can effectively disappear.
Even if caught, individuals who engage in these types of bad acts rarely have
sufficient assets to pay for the losses they impose. Some estimates put the costs of
prominent Internet worms and viruses in the billions of dollars,35 and those estimates
might undercount the harm as they measure only commercial productivity losses and
disruptions to commerce, thus ignoring the costs of countermeasures like anti-virus
software, as well as less quantifiable harms such as missed opportunities for
communication and the frustration experienced by computer users who are victimized.
Numbers of that magnitude render the typical bad actor judgment proof, as these sums
easily swamp most individuals’ personal assets. One possible response is, of course,
criminal liability. However, where the risk of apprehension is sufficiently small and the
magnitude of the losses is sufficiently large, workable criminal punishments often cannot
34

Erich Luening and Wylie Wong, Virus set for Jan. 1, 2000, CNET News.com (Dec. 3, 1999), available at
http://news.com.com/Virus+set+for+Jan.+1,+2000/2100-1001_3-233907.html.
35
See Alison Langley, Computer Viruses Are Frustrating Insurers, Too, The New York Times, October 12,
2003, at s. 3, p. 4. Insurers refuse to provide substantial insurance against many kinds of malicious attacks,
especially viruses and worms, because the risks are not independent.
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be made high enough to adequately deter. Further problems include the reluctance of
juries to impose sufficiently large sentences for these non-violent crimes, and the fact that
incarceration is expensive to the state.36
Interestingly, these concerns about actors being beyond the reach of the law do not
apply to the individuals and entities who, instead of creating an Internet pest,
inadvertently help a pest to propagate. An example might be a firm whose server is run in
such a way that it can be easily taken over by an outside party, or the grandmother who
relentlessly clicks to install malicious programs when asked to do so by websites or
anonymous email solicitations. There is no reason to believe that the parties in these
hypotheticals lack the resources necessary to pay for the harm they cause, as an ordinary
user likely contributes only a small amount to any total loss. Nor is there any reason to
believe that these bad actors would be hard to track down. Computer users who fail to
exercise appropriate caution when opening email attachments are hardly likely to be
sophisticated enough to simultaneously cover their tracks in the event of a problem. The
only sense in which these sorts of individuals are beyond the reach of law is the practical
concern about the costs of identifying and suing these parties as compared to the share of
the damages that can be collected from them. Regardless, our caution here is just that, to
the extent that the argument in favor of indirect liability is premised on the assumption
that the relevant bad actor is beyond the reach of the law, that argument is much weaker
as applied to these individuals—although, as will become clear in a moment, there are
other reasons why indirect liability might be warranted even in these sorts of cases.
2. Contracts and Transaction Costs
A second issue raised in our baseline analysis concerned the role of contracts and
transaction costs. We noted that unless transaction costs interfere with contracting,
affected parties can allocate liability efficiently through contractual design. More
concretely, if the problem is that user1 who subscribes to ISP1 is harmed by user2 who
36

There are second-order concerns as well, such as the fact that defendants will invest more resources
resisting long sentences than they will short ones. There are also equitable concerns, as it might seem
inappropriate to establish a legal system where, by design, only a small fraction of the culpable parties are
punished, but those that are punished suffer extraordinarily large penalties. Lastly, it is often important to
keep penalties low enough that there is a plausible threat of an additional penalty if the relevant bad actor
further misbehaves. Otherwise, after crossing the relevant threshold, bad actors have no incentive to
mitigate the harm they cause.
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subscribes to ISP2, the puzzle for us is to ask why the parties do not just use contract law
to allocate liability amongst themselves. Indeed, even assuming that users are judgment
proof, ISP1 and ISP2 could agree that each is liable to the other for harms caused by their
respective subscribers, and they should do so if indirect liability of this sort is efficient.
Given that ISPs have not chosen to implement such agreements, what reason is there for
imposing indirect liability on them through tort law?
An intuitive answer is that there are so many Internet service providers in operation
that the transaction costs of negotiating these contracts would be prohibitive. But that
explanation is only marginally satisfying, because ISPs themselves are already all part of
a complicated and all-inclusive network of contracts, specifically the peering and transmit
arrangements under which the various private owners of the Internet backbone agree to
carry traffic one to another.37 A more satisfying explanation is that any network of
contracts focusing on issues of cyber-security would be perpetually out of date, and
updating such a complicated web of interdependent security obligations would be all but
impossible given the number of parties involved and the complicated questions any
update would raise regarding the appropriate adjustments to the flow of payments.38
Still, there are puzzles lurking. Microsoft has licensing agreements with a huge
percentage of home computer users, and thus the firm seems to be in the perfect position
to ensure that these users take sensible precautions like updating their virus software and
downloading system patches. Microsoft could even make those obligations self-executing
by blocking Internet access for any computer whose software is (say) more than 10 days
out of date. Instead, Microsoft merely offers updates to its customers and allows each
customer to decide whether the private benefits of a given update warrant the private
costs in terms of time and convenience. The result might very well be a classic prisoner’s
dilemma where Microsoft’s customers as a group would be better off were each to update
regularly, but, without coordination, each customer opts to update more rarely. This
37

For an introduction to these interconnection issues, see Benjamin, Lichtman & Shelanski,
Telecommunications Law and Policy 915-25 (Carolina Academic Press 2001).
38
Bounded rationality might be an additional limitation on the ability of Internet subscribers to efficiently
create the optimal indirect liability regime through private contracts. The many users who today are still
clicking to execute email attachments from strangers are as a practical matter unlikely to be sufficiently
rational contract negotiators. Their blind spots undermine any argument that private parties will, if left to
their own devices, be able to efficiently shift and allocate responsibility for online security.
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suggests that there must be a bigger problem with contractual solutions—public
relations? privacy concerns? security?39—although in truth the explanation might simply
be that Microsoft is at the moment in too precarious a position vis-à-vis worldwide
antitrust authorities to do anything that might be perceived as the use of its market power
to foist additional software on unwilling consumers.
3. Control
As we note in the more general discussion, indirect liability is primarily attractive
in cases where the indirectly liable party can detect, deter, or otherwise influence the bad
acts in question. We are not experts on Internet technologies; however, ISPs seem to be a
natural choice on this criterion, as they are in a good position to take precautions that
would reduce the risk of, and harm done by, cyber-mischief.
Focus first on the primary ISP that provides the gateway through which a
troublemaking user obtains access to the Internet. This primary ISP can detect criminal
behavior by analyzing patterns of use, much as a bank can detect credit card theft by
monitoring a customer’s pattern of purchases. Some patterns of use are intrinsically
suspicious, for instance a continuous stream of communications from a home user. Other
patterns are suspicious because they represent a radical departure from the user’s ordinary
behavior. If an ISP programs its computers to create a profile for each user, and then
regularly compares the user’s current patterns with that historic profile, the ISP should be
able to detect this genre of unauthorized usage and intervene.
We can imagine interventions of various forms. A minimally intrusive form would
involve recording a subscriber’s data stream and storing that information, ideally in
encrypted form, for a period of time. If authorities, responding to independent
information, then contact the ISP and present necessary search warrants and the like, the
ISP would provide the authorities with this record. Many offenders could be traced if
ISPs were to record traffic in this manner; but ISPs do not routinely record traffic today
both because of privacy concerns and because of the enormous volume of

39

An automatic update system like the one we propose would become an attractive target for hackers
because it could conceivably be used to corrupt a large number of computers simultaneously. Then again,
the current voluntary system suffers the same flaw, albeit on a slightly smaller scale.
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communications. Legal rules, however, could ease these concerns. For instance, the law
could require that ISPs store the information securely and release it only to law
enforcement officials, thus lessening the worry that stored information would leak out by
accident or be used for other purposes. The law could also require that ISPs record
information about the data communication—size, duration, timing, and so on—but not its
substance, in that way further reducing privacy concerns. To lessen volume, meanwhile, a
similar rule could be used, in that summary information about a given communication
would likely be less sizeable than a full reproduction of the communication itself, or an
alternative approach could be adopted, for example requiring ISPs to record information
only when particular triggers raise suspicion, or perhaps only when authorities explicitly
ask that the information be recorded.40 The amount of time that information would need
to be stored could also be tweaked to address concerns about storage costs, assuming
these concerns are valid and not a pretext advanced by ISPs to avoid regulation.
More aggressive ISP interventions might also be possible. For instance, although
the details are far outside our area of expertise, we can imagine a world where an ISP that
detects suspicious activity could phone the user and ask whether and how he is using his
computer; this would be a way of detecting third party hacking. Or an ISP could have a
policy of shutting down or slowing a connection where the pattern of usage—say, a
sudden spike of activity, or the repeated appearance of identical computer code attached
to a large number of outgoing email messages—suggests that the computer in question
has been hijacked and put to use in cyber-crime. We can also imagine more significant
changes to the architecture of information transmission, for instance a system in which
anyone who sends an email is required to post a small bond, money that would be
forfeited if it were to later turn out that the email contained a virus or other harmful code.

40

The right approach might be to empower government officials to require ISPs to store information
without any particular showing or court order, but then to permit government officials to access that
information only with a court order in hand. This would free the government to act quickly in terms of
preserving evidence, but it would still respect privacy interests until the government could make a
sufficient case. This approach has many virtues: for instance, it preserves evidence during that gap between
when the government first becomes suspicious and when the government can corroborate its suspicions, a
gap during which evidence today is often lost; and it allows for narrow searches of the stored information
to be followed up with broader searches in cases where later events suggest that there is more to be learned
from the stored data. Computer scientist Carl Gunther has been working on various technologies along
these lines, and was helpful in explaining these technologies to us.
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We have focused thus far on bad acts engaged in by a subscriber or accomplished
using a subscriber’s account, but turn now to the role ISPs might play in detecting
criminal behavior that originates on a rival firm’s network. When an ISP receives a
packet or message from another ISP, it might be able to detect aspects of the packet that
indicate a likelihood of criminal activity. For example, an ISP might alone, or in
cooperation with other ISPs, notice an unusual spike in demand, indicating a denial of
service attack or a rapidly multiplying virus or worm. ISPs might even be able to develop
efficient protocols for pooling information about changes in traffic patterns and in that
way alert one another, and also customers, of suspicious behaviors in time to trace them
back to their source or at least shut them down.
We could go on for some time with examples along these lines. However, our goal
for now is not to determine the precise precautions that ISPs should or will take in
response to liability—quite the opposite, we are painfully aware of our outsider status
when it comes to technology design—but instead to make clear that ISPs are in a good
position to influence the number and severity of cyber-attacks. Indirect liability would
pressure ISPs to take this task seriously, encouraging the people who have the proper
technical expertise to implement whatever turn out to be the most effective precautions.
4. Activity Level
While, in theory, indirect liability can be attractive independent of its role in
encouraging detection and deterrence, in practice we doubt that arguments about activity
levels would on their own lead us to favor indirect liability for ISPs. Our hesitation does
not derive from any doubts over whether ISPs impose negative externalities as they enroll
new customers and offer new services; of course there are externalities at play, given that
any new subscriber can turn out to be a careless grandma, and any new service can
quickly devolve into a portal for Internet contagion. The concern instead derives from the
fact that there are drawbacks to imposing liability solely because of negative
externalities, and we think those drawbacks are significant in this particular application.
One drawback associated with the activity level rationale is that it might distort
incentives by forcing parties to internalize negative externalities even though they often
cannot internalize equally sizeable positive externalities. As applied here, the negative

20

externality is the aforementioned concern that each new subscriber could materially
reduce cyber-security by engaging in unsafe practices or intentionally introducing an
Internet pest.41 The comparable positive externality is that each subscriber can just as
plausibly turn out to be the kind of grandma who makes significant purchases online or
the type of college student who posts to newsgroups and contributes to the development
of open source software. A legal rule that relentlessly brings home negative externalities
but at the same time fails to account for positive externalities has no claim at creating
optimal incentives. Thus, a rule that imposes liability based on negative externalities
might do more harm than good, although the actual analysis turns on the relative size of
any ignored positive externalities, and the difficulty of accounting for those externalities
through other means. We will say more about that below.
A second drawback to the activity level rationale—and on this, too, we will say
much more below—is the concern that imposing liability on one party almost inevitably
discourages another party from taking adequate precautions. Applied here, the worry is
that imposing liability on ISPs might inefficiently reduce subscriber incentives to install
virus protection software and maintain adequate firewalls and backups. This is a concern
associated with indirect liability no matter what the rationale; but the concern resonates
with particular force in cases where indirect liability is being used solely as a means by
which to influence the liable party’s activity level. The reason: these are cases where by
assumption the liable party cannot take additional cost-justified precautions; reductions in
the level of care taken by other parties therefore warrant considerable weight.
A third argument against imposing strict liability in this setting is that activity
levels are already significantly suppressed. Worms, viruses, and the like reduce the allure
of Internet access and thus discourage Internet use no matter what the liability rule. This
is a natural reduction in activity levels, and—while there is no reason to believe that it
leads to efficient levels of activity42—the existence of this natural disincentive does
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See discussion in Section II.B.4.
The disincentive discussed above perfectly calibrates activity levels in situations where externalities are
sufficiently symmetric. Imagine a simple such case: a world with three subscribers where each imposes on
each other a negative externality of two dollars. The first subscriber in this setting imposes four dollars
worth of harm, namely two dollars imposed on each of two peers, but also suffers a total of four dollars
worth of harm, again two dollars from each of two peers. To the extent that similar sorts of symmetry might
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combine with the concerns mentioned above to make any additional reduction seem not
only less important, but also more difficult to calibrate.
All that said, activity level concerns can be important, and hence we do harbor
some uncertainty about where to draw this line. Consider again Microsoft. Even if
Microsoft cannot take additional precautions against Internet contagion, the price
increase that would result from an increase in liability would itself have social benefits in
that the resulting price would better reflect the relative value of the Windows operating
system as compared to alternatives like Apple Computer’s operating system, Mac OS.
Many computer enthusiasts believe that Mac OS is more stable and secure than
Windows. If so, this benefit is not today adequately captured in the products’ relative
prices. By increasing liability and hence (by assumption) disproportionately increasing
the price of Windows software, however, an indirect liability rule could solve that
problem, ultimately driving business toward the more secure and efficient alternative.
More generally, in situations where there are multiple competing products, each of
which is capable of generating a comparable positive externality, it might be attractive to
use indirect liability to ensure that prices reflect each product’s unique negative
externalities. Suppose, for example, that ISP access provided over the telephone lines
using DSL technology is worse, from a cyber-security standpoint, than ISP access
provided using the cable infrastructure. If true, and even if providers of these
technologies cannot take any additional cost-justified precautions, liability might be
attractive. The technology that imposes the greater security risks would under a liability
regime cost more, and that price difference would drive customers to the socially
preferred technology.43
II. Objections
Our argument thus far is that indirect liability is attractive primarily because ISPs
are in a good position to deter the various acts associated with cyber-insecurity, and
be created in the ISP setting—for example, by forcing each ISP to serve a similar population—activity
levels could be calibrated without the introduction of legal liability.
43
The details turn out to be slightly more complicated, as DSL prices are distorted by the unbundling rules
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which in essence require existing local telephone companies to
rent their infrastructure—including DSL capability—to rivals at regulated rates. For an introduction to the
issues, see Benjamin et al., cited in note 37, at 715-55.
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perhaps secondarily because liability would force ISPs to internalize some of the negative
externalities they impose; and that any indirect liability regime needs to be created by law
rather than by contract both because many of the relevant bad actors are beyond the reach
of law, and because transactions costs are a serious obstacle to any contractual solution
anyway. We turn now to what we anticipate to be the primary objections to our analysis:
first, the concern that liability will cause ISPs to overreact and thus exclude subscribers
who should be online; and, second, the concern that liability will inefficiently interfere
with subscriber efforts at self-help.
A. Overzealous ISPs
The most common objection to ISP liability is that liability will deter ISPs from
offering service to innocent but risky users. Phrased in the more formal language of
economics, the concern is that a positive externality is created every time a new user
subscribes to Internet service; and thus, if Internet access is priced at marginal cost, some
subscribers will not purchase Internet access even in situations where the social benefits
of access exceed the social costs.44 More intuitively, indirect liability will inevitably raise
the price of service because of the added costs and legal exposure, and, while that higher
price might better represent the real costs associated with Internet access, it will also
drive some marginal subscribers out of the market despite the fact that advertisers,
information providers, merchants, friends, and various other subscribers might in the
aggregate prefer that this marginal customer remain. The problem is just an externality—
a mismatch between the private incentive to subscribe to Internet service and the social
benefits made possible by that same subscription.
Our first response is that this concern, while plausible, seems overdrawn. Many of
what at first sound like positive externalities turn out to be influences that are well
accounted for in a subscriber’s decision of whether or not to subscribe. For instance,
Lichtman certainly benefits from the fact that his mother is regularly online and hence
available for easy email correspondence, but that is not an externality because Lichtman
and his Mom have a rich relationship through which he can indicate to her how much he
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If the social costs exceed the social benefits, by contrast, there is no problem, because under this
condition the subscriber should not be online.
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values her presence and, if necessary, contribute in cash or kind toward the monthly costs
of her subscription. So, too, the online bookseller Amazon benefits from Mom’s Internet
access, but Amazon also has ways of helping her to internalize that effect, for instance by
offering her a new-customer discount and rewarding her with free shipping on purchases
over some minimum threshold. This is obviously not to say that all externalities are
accounted for, but only to suggest that the problem is not as stark as it might at first seem,
and not all that different from a million other markets where there exist incidental
positive externalities that slip through the decision-making cracks.45
Second, even if there are non-trivial positive externalities at play, note that it would
be counterproductive to respond to the problem by reducing ISP liability from its
otherwise optimal level. Simply put, if the concern here is that higher prices will force
marginal subscribers to leave the market, the reality is that an increase in worm and virus
activity will also drive away marginal subscribers. That is, cyber-insecurity, like an
increase in price, is a cost associated with online access; it, too, will make Internet access
less attractive to private parties, and thus it too threatens to inefficiently drive away
customers whose private benefits fall short even though the social benefits they make
possible would justify their continued presence online.
Now the choice between these evils is itself an interesting question. One might at
first suspect that indirect liability produces the better form of exclusion because ISPs will
channel that exclusion such that it affects more significantly those users who are
perceived to pose the greatest likelihood of harm. Thus, a user whose actions online
reveal him to be a risky user will be charged a higher price by his ISP, whereas a user
who credibly signals safety will be charged a correspondingly lower fee. The economic
45

One way to think about this economic problem is to note that connecting to the Internet is a prerequisite
to shopping online, talking with friends, receiving advertisements, and so on; and that this is an expensive
prerequisite both in terms of the price charged, and in terms of the frustration experienced by users who are
not quite computer-literate. Knowing this, parties that benefit from having the marginal subscriber online
will attempt to compensate that subscriber by, for example, offering sale prices. But there are two
limitations on that approach. One is that some parties have no clear mechanism by which to reward the
marginal consumer, in that these parties cannot easily transfer resources directly to the relevant user. The
other is that there will be some free-riding, which is to say that some parties with the ability to reward the
marginal consumer will choose not to, hoping that other parties will sacrifice sufficiently to induce the
subscription. This latter problem is actually a generic problem that plagues any market where there is some
form of a prerequisite, as Lichtman explains more fully in Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging
Platform Technologies, 29 J Leg. Stud. 615 (2000).
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effect is that indirect liability should disproportionately exclude those subscribers who
are in fact the least desirable subscribers. The exclusion caused by worms and viruses, by
contrast, lacks such nuance. A denial of service attack can slow even the most responsible
user’s machine to a crawl, and viruses that interfere with the delivery of email messages
again affect all users, regardless of their individual behaviors. It is true that Internet pests
impose greater costs on careless users than they do on careful ones; a user who regularly
updates his virus software and backs up his files has less to fear from Internet contagion,
because his computer will more likely be resistant. But this argument does not apply to
malicious users who intentionally contaminate the network, and because of them it seems
likely that the targeted exclusion caused by indirect liability is more appealing than the
less focused exclusions caused by worms and viruses.
Regardless, there is no reason to choose from among these second-best alternatives,
as quickly becomes apparent when one switches attention away from Internet access and
toward more conventional legal settings. Inventors produce devices that stimulate further
innovation. In response, society rewards them by granting them valuable property rights
called patents. Does anyone really believe that society should instead shield inventors
from liability if their inventions cause harm? Similarly, restaurants draw crowds that
patronize neighboring businesses and stimulate the local economy. Authorities therefore
sometimes offer tax breaks to restaurants that are willing to locate in depressed
neighborhoods. Would it be desirable to instead entice entry by offering to stop
inspecting for violations of the health code? People who generate positive externalities
are not typically compensated by tort immunity. Quite the opposite, even an entity that
produces positive externalities should still take due care and internalize the harm it
causes. There is nothing special in this respect about the Internet. Immunizing ISPs from
liability is not the correct mechanism for encouraging them to provide positive
externalities.
We see two better approaches. One is to subsidize the provision of Internet access,
for example by offering tax incentives to ISPs based on the size of their subscriber base.
The government today already subsidizes Internet access by providing a great deal of the
equipment that makes up the Internet backbone, and also by forbidding states from
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collecting sales tax on large categories of otherwise taxable Internet transactions.46 Those
existing subsidies alone might be sufficient;47 but, if necessary, the government can do
more. For instance, in the context of the regular voice telephone system, the federal
government subsidizes the purchase of local telephone service both through specific
programs designed to assist poor and rural subscribers, and through more general pricing
policies that favor residential users over commercial ones.48 The logic there is similar to
the logic under consideration here; the telephone system is just another network out of
which individuals might inefficiently opt but for the appropriate government subsidy.
A second approach would have the government work with ISPs to redesign Internet
protocols so that ISPs could more precisely charge one another for transferring
information.49 Under the current system, an ISP that adds a user to its network does not
capture the full benefits that the new user makes possible. However, if ISPs could charge
one another for relaying messages back and forth, and then in turn pass those costs and
payments along to their customers, each ISP would internalize the benefits of adding a
new user, and thus each would better weigh the benefits as well as the costs every time it
confronted the question of what price to charge for access.
B. Self-Help
It is true that, by imposing liability on ISPs, our approach would reduce subscriber
incentives to practice safe computing, install firewalls and virus protection software, and
similarly engage in prudent self-help. This is troubling because subscribers are often in a
better position than their ISP to determine that their computers have been hacked; and,
relatedly, users are often themselves in a good position to take simple, inexpensive, but
effective precautions like using appropriate passwords in order to prevent unauthorized
use. Furthermore, when subscribers are looking to protect their computers from cyber-
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Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2719 (1998) (included as Title XI of the
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999).
47
These subsidies were originally put in place when the Internet was in its infancy and the market for
Internet service was therefore subject to rapid and unpredictable change. Now that the market has matured,
any justification along those lines seems less valid, but the issues identified in the text suggest that the
subsidies perhaps should remain.
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Again, for more information, consult Benjamin, cited in note 37, at 614-623, 712-714, 768-91.
49
Telephone companies do this, exchanging cash when one company originates a call that another
company terminates. See id. at 749-55, 927-45.
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mischief, the competitive market responds with third-party software and technology; that
market might not be as active in a world where subscribers are uninterested and thus the
only buyers are regulated telephone companies and other entities that provide Internet
infrastructure.50
It is important, however, not to overstate these tensions. ISPs have a direct
contractual relationship with their subscribers, and so surely a liable ISP will require that
each of its subscribers adopt rudimentary precautions along the lines sketched above.
Better still, those contract terms can easily be enforced by technology, which is to say
that an ISP can block any subscriber whose virus definitions are horribly out of date or
whose firewall is malfunctioning. Even outside of any contractual obligations, it is
typically in a subscriber’s own interest to protect his computer, at least to the extent that
precautions are not too cumbersome. In fact, one suspects that the real obstacle to selfprotection at the moment is merely a lack of information. Were ISPs to better explain to
users exactly how to minimize their exposure, many users would happily cooperate,
wanting to protect their personal documents, digital music, and family photos from
contamination and irreversible loss.
All that to one side, our main response to the concern about reduced incentives to
engage in self-help is that, even at its strongest, this effect does not argue against indirect
liability writ large, but instead simply suggests a need for a tailored threshold of liability
that would leave some pressure on subscribers to take additional care. This is just like the
airline example where the conventional wisdom argues against holding airports strictly
liable for pollution and noise externalities, the fear being that neighbors would then
ignore those factors when deciding how best to use nearby properties. The parallel
concern here leads us to again favor some form of a balanced liability regime—like
comparative negligence, where the harm is allocated in proportion to each party’s
negligent behavior; or strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence, which
forgives indirect liability in instances where the victim failed to exercise due care—as a
50

Then again, changing the identity of the buyers might have beneficial effect, as ISPs are surely more
educated consumers. The only obvious concerns would be if ISPs enjoy sufficient market power that they
would be able to arrogate to themselves more of the benefits created by innovative third-party security
options, thereby depressing other firms’ incentives to create them; or if regulations applicable to ISPs
somehow interfere with their ability to purchase security assistance through normal market interactions.
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way to account simultaneously for the incentives faced by users and ISPs. Complete
immunity for ISPs, however, makes little sense. There are precautions that ISPs can and
should undertake, and shifting the full costs of accidents to ISP subscribers would
inefficiently reduce each ISP’s incentive to take care.
On this same theme, note that nothing that we say about indirect liability for ISPs is
meant to suggest that Internet subscribers should themselves be immunized from liability.
Many users have deep pockets—businesses and universities, for example—and making
them liable for cyber-mischief will create additional incentives to take precautions and
avoid intentional torts. Liability would also create a beneficial cascade in which these
businesses and universities would then work to prevent employees, students, and the like
from similarly engaging in intentional bad acts or adopting inadequate security
precautions. The general insight, then, is that neither users nor ISPs should be given a
complete pass when it comes to cyber-security. Each has a role to play, and each should
therefore be held accountable at least in part.
C. Other Objections
While the previous sections consider the two primary objections to ISP liability,
there are of course other issues to address. We survey a few of those below.
One problem with ISP liability is that often the harm will be so diffuse that no
victim in isolation will have a sufficient incentive to bring suit. An example might be a
situation where a user launches a worm that slows down the Internet somewhat, resulting
in some delays and loss of business, but does not harm any individual or business very
much. Here, we have a classic case of diffuse harm, similar to pollution that bothers
many people but not enough to motivate litigation. There are two standard solutions to
this problem. First, entrepreneurial lawyers might combine all the victims into a single
class, and sue on behalf of the class. Attorney fees give the lawyers an incentive to launch
the lawsuit. Second, the government—through assistant attorneys general or an
appropriate agency such as the Federal Trade Commission—could bring the lawsuit.

28

There are advantages and disadvantages to these approaches, but they are well known and
hence we will not repeat them.51
A related problem concerns allocation of liability across ISPs. A communication
that originates a virus, for example, might pass through dozens or hundreds or thousands
of ISPs before claiming its first victim. Suppose any one of them could have detected the
virus; should liability be allocated such that each ISP pays only its pro rata share?
Certainly one good answer here is joint and several liability, which allows victims to sue
any of the liable ISPs for the entire harm. The chosen ISP could then pass along some of
the expense to its culpable peers. In this way joint and several liability lowers the barrier
to litigation as faced by the injured party. Rather than having to identify and sue all the
relevant ISPs, the victim can sue the easiest target and leave any division up to litigation
between, and perhaps contracts among, the various ISPs.
An additional worry related to ISP liability is the possibility that imposing liability
will have perverse effects, for example encouraging ISPs to store less information and in
that way make effective legal intervention more difficult.52 These sorts of concerns can
be addressed either by the procedures for proving liability or its substance. Thinking first
about the standard: if the burden of proof is placed on the ISP to prove adequate
precautions, these sorts of strategic responses become less attractive from the ISP’s
perspective. With respect to the substance, meanwhile, the decision not to keep adequate
information could itself be deemed actionable, thus more explicitly encouraging ISPs not
to strategically destroy information. All this is fully consistent with our earlier remarks
concerning employer/employee liability; as we pointed out there, employers are typically
held strictly liable for the torts of their employees, in part because the more careful
inquiry into exactly what precautions were and should have been taken is also subject to
these sorts of informational games.53
A final objection to ISP liability is the familiar concern that any domestic legal
regime will have only a limited effect because of the problem of foreign ISPs. Suppose
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that the U.S. adopts the optimal ISP liability regime, with one result being that any major
cyber-crime originating with an American ISP can be traced back to its source.
According to this argument, American Internet users would nevertheless remain
vulnerable to foreign criminals who launch attacks from computers in countries with
weaker Internet regulation, and also from American criminals who are able to hide their
identities by routing incriminating packets through those same foreign ISPs. Imposing
liability might therefore seem to be an empty gesture, merely shifting criminal behavior
from one ISP to another.
The problem is acute because of the “weakest-link” nature of the Internet. There are
roughly 200 states; suppose that 199 of them have the optimal Internet security system.
The other state—call it Estonia—has no regulation. The ISPs there keep no records, so
law enforcement authorities cannot trace cyber-crimes to particular users. Not only can
criminals in our hypothetical Estonia therefore launch untraceable attacks on users
anywhere in the world; criminals in the 199 other countries can launch untraceable
attacks on users anywhere in the world by routing their messages through Estonian ISPs.
Worse, authorities in, say, Canada, cannot solve this problem by refusing to allow
packets that pass through Estonia to cross Canadian borders because (absent a massive
change to the architecture of the Internet) there is no way for a Canadian ISP to determine
whether a packet it receives ever passed through an ISP located in Estonia, unless it
receives that packet directly from an Estonian ISP rather than an ISP in a third country.
Thus, as long as there is one state with bad regulations—and currently there are dozens of
states with bad regulations—cyber-crime, including purely domestic cyber-crime routed
through foreign ISPs, will be difficult to trace and stop.
However, even in a world where foreign rules offer little assistance and it is
relatively easy for cyber-criminals to take advantage of the weakest state’s rules—and
one might wonder whether those statements are true, given how often cyber-criminals are
being arrested abroad54—domestic regulations can still reduce the likelihood that any
given pest will propagate. Indeed, as we have pointed out before, domestic ISPs can
detect disturbing patterns in the packets they receive from other sources, they can
54
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pressure subscribers to adopt appropriate security precautions, and they can themselves
adopt policies that mitigate the harm caused by worms, viruses, and the like. Weak
foreign regimes therefore might interfere with some of the deterrence effect that would
otherwise be achieved by the optimal ISP regime, but it certainly does not fully eliminate
an ISP’s ability to protect its customers and other ISPs through various precautionary
techniques.
Moreover, one country’s rules can and certainly do influence the rules adopted by
economic and political partners. Thus, if the United States were to adopt a more stringent
set of ISP regulations, it could pressure allies and trading partners to adopt a similarly
forceful regime. It might do so using the normal tools of international diplomacy—
adjusting terms of trade, offering an economic or political quid pro quo, and so on—or it
might do so by adjusting the rules that govern the flow of Internet traffic.55 For instance,
suppose that the United States and a few other core states such as Japan, the European
Union nations, and Canada enter into an agreement requiring each state to exclude
Internet packets from (1) all states that have bad Internet regulation, and (2) all states
with good Internet regulation that do not exclude packets from states with bad Internet
regulation. With a core group signed onto such an agreement, a state like (say) China will
face the choice between adopting the required Internet policies and enjoying free
communication with its main trading partners, or persisting with a less secure regime but
no longer being able to communicate over the Internet with member countries. China, we
suspect, would choose the former option, and that would in turn put more pressure on the
next outlier nation to capitulate as well. As more states make this decision and enter the
secure bubble, the opportunity cost of remaining outside the bubble would increase, and
eventually a healthy percentage of the world’s states would be working within a more
secure Internet architecture.
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III. Recent Cases
We have argued thus far that Internet service providers should be held liable for a
variety of cyber-security harms; yet recent trends in the law have pressed in the opposite
direction. The trend in the legislature we mentioned at the outset: the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 immunize ISPs
from liability that common law principles would otherwise impose. The trend in the
courts looks no better. One recent decision, for example, reads the Communications
Decency Act to provide immunity even in settings where the “communication” at issue is
not a defamatory statement, but rather a snippet of malicious computer code. Another
questions ISP liability more broadly, asking whether ISPs should ever be held liable for
harms imposed on “strangers”—that is, Internet users who connect using an ISP other
than the one accused of failing to take adequate care. These and related decisions are
troubling from our perspective, as they stand as an obstacle to the legal rules we think
appropriate.
In this final section of the Essay, we therefore set out to consider several of these
decisions in fuller detail. We should make clear before doing so that we do not have
strong priors about whether ISP liability should be imposed via federal statute or, instead,
through the more gradual mechanism of common law development. There are advantages
and disadvantages to both approaches, and in the end much turns on which approach
better gathers, communicates, and updates information about ISP capabilities. Our
purpose, then, is not to weigh in on that particular tradeoff, but instead to address some of
the stumbling blocks that have unnecessarily and prematurely derailed that worthwhile
inquiry. Our position is that one should not read the Communications Decency Act to
sweepingly preempt state and common law liability for Internet service providers, and
one should not interpret the common law such that ISPs have no duty to exercise care in
the first place. Beyond that, we understand that reasonable minds might disagree about
the precise mechanisms for and contours of ISP liability, and we simply urge that some
form of liability be brought to bear.
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A. The Communications Decency Act
In cases involving business disparagement, defamation, and related state and
common law wrongs, the standard legal approach has been to hold speakers and
publishers strictly liable for the communications they put forward, but to immunize
booksellers, libraries, and similar “distributors” so long as they neither knew, nor had
reason to know, of the underlying bad act.56 Thus, if an article in Time magazine is found
to impermissibly besmirch an individual’s reputation, the writer might be held
accountable for defamation, and the publisher might be required to pay damages, but,
barring exceptional circumstances, shops that sell the magazine and libraries that lend it
face no legal exposure.
Before the Communications Decency Act was enacted, courts endeavored to apply
this liability framework to ISPs. Thus, in Cubby v. Compuserve,57 the court refused to
hold an early ISP accountable for defamatory statements communicated through its
equipment, primarily because the relevant ISP was, in the court’s view, a passive
distributor of that information, rather than its publisher. “A computerized database is the
functional equivalent of a more traditional news vendor, and the inconsistent application
of a lower standard of liability to an electronic news distributor than that applied to a
public library, book store, or newsstand would impose an undue burden on the free flow
of information.”58 Soon after came Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services,59 where on
similar facts a different court determined that the relevant ISP was more appropriately
characterized as a publisher. “By actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete
notes from its computer bulletin boards . . . [this ISP] is clearly making decisions as to
content, and such decisions constitute editorial control.”60 Other courts similarly worked
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to select the appropriate analogy based on the facts of the dispute at hand, with the result
in each case being heavily influenced by the accused ISP’s own choices with respect to
its usage policies, its enforcement practices, and its technologies.
This gradual development of touchstones and distinctions might have continued for
some time but for a simple and predictable problem: the liability rules were discouraging
ISPs from attempting to filter problematic communications. After all, an ISP that refused
to self-regulate was likely to fall under the Cubby analysis and be characterized as a
passive, and hence virtually immune, distributor. An ISP that endeavored to filter, by
contrast, was vulnerable to the Stratton Oakmont line of reasoning and its associated legal
risks. The result was that, because ISPs were so flexible in terms of the precise role they
could play in online communication, the standard liability framework created a perverse
incentive to sit idly by without even attempting to detect and deter bad acts.61 That
strange state of affairs led Congress to revamp the ISP liability regime by enacting the
Communications Decency Act of 1996.
For our purposes, the key provision is section 230, which states that an ISP will not
be “treated as the publisher or speaker of any information” provided by a subscriber or
other information source.62 Debates over the proper interpretation of this clause rage, and
along two distinct dimensions. First, does the provision eliminate all forms of liability for
ISPs, or does it more simply eliminate publisher liability while leaving distributor
liability intact? Second, does the word “information” include only communications that
would otherwise be regulated under defamation and similar tort theories—legal rules that
obviously implicate serious First Amendment concerns—or does it expand to include any
data passed by an ISP, including the various forms of malicious computer code of interest
here? Courts have answered these questions so as to preempt all forms of ISP liability
and, further, to apply that immunity to all forms of information; but those readings are
flawed, in our view, in that they interpret the statute far more broadly that its language,
history, or underlying policy goals can bear.
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On the first question, the leading case is Zeran v. America Online,63 where a panel
on the Fourth Circuit held that section 230 “creates a federal immunity to any cause of
action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a thirdparty user of the service,” irrespective of whether the ISP in forwarding that information
acted as publisher, distributor, or both.64 Speaking to the distinction between publishers
and distributors, the court held that by its express terms section 230 immunizes both
types of disseminator, because, in this court’s view, distributors are just a type of
publisher anyway. As the court put it, distributor liability is “merely a subset, or a
species, of publisher liability, and is therefore also foreclosed by §230.”65 “Even
distributors are considered to be publishers for purposes of defamation law.”66
The court bolstered its analysis with policy arguments regarding an issue we
addressed earlier in this Essay, namely the concern that distributor liability would lead
ISPs to be overzealous in their filtering of online communications.
If computer service providers were subject to distributor liability, they
would face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially
defamatory statement—from any party, concerning any message. Each
notification would require a careful yet rapid investigation of the
circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judgment
concerning the information's defamatory character, and an on-the-spot
editorial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the continued
publication of that information. Although this might be feasible for the
traditional print publisher, the sheer number of postings on interactive
computer services would create an impossible burden in the Internet
context. Because service providers would be subject to liability only for
the publication of information, and not for its removal, they would have a
natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification, whether
the contents were defamatory or not. Thus, like [publisher] liability,
[distributor liability] has a chilling effect on the freedom of Internet
speech.67
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As a number of commentators now urge,68 Zeran is wrong. On the question of
statutory construction, section 230 explicitly uses the word “publisher”; and, given the
long history of cases drawing a distinction between publishers and distributors, we agree
with a recent California court that it is “entirely reasonable to assume that Congress was
aware of this significant and very well-established distinction” and that, if Congress had
intended the Zeran reading, it would have added the word “distributor” to the clause.69
Congress did no such thing. The most plausible reading, then, is that the specific
enumeration of “publisher” and “speaker” was meant to leave distributor liability intact.70
On policy, Zeran fares no better. We have already discussed the limitations
associated with arguments about overzealous ISPs; our points were that market forces
will largely discipline this sort of behavior, and that, to the extent any significant
externalities remain, tort immunity is not an efficient response. But note that the Zeran
court makes an additional mistake when it assumes that a mere accusation would be
sufficient to trigger liability under a distributor regime. In a more familiar setting, this
sounds absurd. Would a court really hold a large bookseller accountable for defamation
solely because a random patron informed the cashier that a particular title contained an
unlawful communication? Of course not. Distributor liability requires only that a
distributor take reasonable precautions. As applied to ISPs, that likely means that an ISP
would not be required to do anything in cases where the only warning was an isolated
accusation; a serious response would be required only upon a greater showing, for
investigate. Thus the incentive described here does not exist; whether a given provider investigates or not,
that provider would be liable if they should have known about a particular troubling communication.
Again, this is the concern about parties hiding their heads in the sand, first mentioned in note 33 and
accompanying text.
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instance the sort of detailed showing that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act requires
before the protections and obligations of that statute are triggered.71
On the second looming interpretive question—whether the word “information” as
used in section 230 includes only those communications that would otherwise be
regulated under defamation and similar expressive tort theories, or expands to include
any information disseminated by an ISP, including the various forms of malicious
computer code of interest to us—we have found only one case. In Green v. America
Online,72 a subscriber (a man named John Green) claimed that another user sent him a
malicious program through a chat room. In the words of the court:
Green alleges that John Doe 1 “sent a punter through [Green’s ISP,
America Online (AOL)], which caused Green’s computer to lock up and
Green had to restart his computer.” Green’s complaint describes a
“punter” as a computer program created by a hacker whose purpose is to
halt and disrupt another computer . . . . Green alleges that he lost five
hours of work restarting his computer, causing him damages of
approximately $400.73
Green apparently asked AOL to take action against the unidentified hacker, but AOL
refused to do so. Green sued AOL for negligently failing to “police its services.”74
The court held that Green’s tort claim was barred. First, citing Zeran, the court
neglected the distinction between publisher-style strict liability and distributor-style
negligence liability, announcing simply that holding AOL liable for negligence would
impermissibly treat AOL as a speaker or publisher. Then, the court applied this expanded
immunity to the facts at hand, reasoning that John Doe 1 is an information content
provider, and AOL must therefore be immune from any form of state law liability thanks
to section 230. Green had argued that John Doe 1 is not an information content provider
because Doe sent a malicious computer program rather than any intelligible
“information.” But the court rejected that argument, noting that the dictionary definition
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of “information” includes any “signal,” and a computer program sent through the Internet
is just a collection of encoded signals.75 In short, the court concluded that malicious code
is “information;” John Doe I is an “information content provider;” section 230 applies to
all tort claims involving third-party information; and thus AOL is not liable.
This reasoning is dubious. In terms of the statute, the word “information” is
ambiguous: it could include any set of signals that is not random noise, or it could be
limited to signals that are used to communicate with humans. More importantly, the
concern that motivated section 230 was the worry that, as a practical matter, ISPs cannot
control or police defamatory content without violating the privacy of their users and
chilling legitimate discussion. But that concern does not extend to situations like the one
presented here. Judgments about defamation are subjective and context-specific, a reality
that makes it all but impossible for ISPs to detect and hence deter that bad act. A
computer program that shuts down a target computer, by contrast, can be more readily
and less intrusively identified. Besides, the social costs of a system where a few innocent
programs are accidentally delayed by an overly cautious ISP seem much less onerous
than the social costs associated with an equivalently imperfect filter that might interfere
with socially important free speech.
Given all this, we urge courts to reject the analysis of Green v. America Online and
instead to interpret section 230 so that its immunity extends only to “information” that is
intelligible to human beings—either in the raw, or as translated by communication
devices such as telephones or computers—and not mere signals that interfere with
Internet communication by shutting down computers or clogging bandwidth.76 That
would link section 230 to the tort claims it was designed to regulate; it is fully consistent
with the language, history, and policies associated with the Communications Decency
Act; and it would free courts to consider the proper contours for ISP liability with respect
to issues of cyber-security.
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B. Common Law Principles
Courts not only have been expanding the scope of the immunity offered by the
Communications Decency Act, they also have been questioning whether common law
liability ought to extend to ISPs in the first place. The best discussion we have found of
this issue is in Doe v. GTE Corporation.77 The case involved a suit by various athletes
who were secretly filmed while undressing in locker rooms. The athletes sued the
producers and sellers of the video tapes—Franco Productions and other entities—but,
because they correctly anticipated that these defendants would disappear without a trace,
they also sued the several ISPs that had hosted Franco’s websites. Judge Easterbrook
wrote for the panel, and, after resolving some interpretive questions regarding a federal
privacy statute, and offering some ideas about the various ways to read section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, he wrote that plaintiffs had failed to assert a state
common law claim. His analysis on this point is why the case is of interest to us.
Easterbrook makes several observations that will be familiar from our discussion.
He notes that landlords are not held liable for dangerous activities that occur on their
premises; carriers such as Federal Express are not held liable for failing to prevent
shipments of dangerous objects; telephone companies are not liable for allowing
customers to use phone lines maliciously; and so forth. ISPs, in Easterbrook’s view,
should be no different:
That [one of the defendant ISPs] supplied some inputs . . . into Franco’s
business does not distinguish it from the lessor of Franco’s office space or
the shipper of the tapes to its customers. Landlord, phone company,
delivery service, and web host all could learn, at some cost, what Franco
was doing with the services and who was potentially injured as a result;
but state law does not require those providers to learn, or to act as good
Samaritans if they do. The common law rarely requires people to protect
strangers, or for that matter acquaintances or employees.78
Easterbrook is right that the common law rarely requires anyone to be a good
Samaritan.79 Where Easterbrook errs, however, is in assuming that ISP liability is best
77

347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 661 (emphasis in original).
79
For a recent discussion, perhaps still on Easterbrook’s mind when he was deciding GTE Corporation, see
Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.3d 479, 480 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.)(“The common law traditionally
took a hard line, rejecting any legal duty to be a good Samaritan. If A saw that B was about to be struck on
78

39

understood as a good Samaritan rule, rather than as a traditional tort. The distinction is
important because, while the common law rarely creates good Samaritan obligations, it
routinely uses tort law to accomplish similar goals. Thus it is tort law, rather than any
good Samaritan obligation, that pressures drivers to watch out for stranger-pedestrians,
and it is again tort law that encourages firms to think twice before polluting a strangerneighbor’s land. Easterbrook never explains why he dismisses ISP liability as if it is some
unusual obligation to do nice things for strangers, rather than a conventional application
of familiar tort law principles.80
We are sympathetic if Easterbrook was simply trying to reach the right outcome in
the case at hand. It is difficult and perhaps even impossible for ISPs to monitor websites
for the sale of illegal video tapes because such tapes cannot easily be distinguished from
perfectly legitimate video content. Given those difficulties, we agree that the ISPs sued in
this particular case should not have been held accountable for their role in transmitting
the tapes. We resist Easterbrook’s analysis, however, because in other cases ISPs may be
able to do more. Just as a delivery service might be held liable for delivering a package
that obviously contains a bomb, or a landlord can be held liable for permitting a use of his
premises that is overtly illegal,81 ISPs might rightly be held liable for permitting
malicious behaviors that they could have detected or deterred at reasonable cost.
Easterbrook’s opinion gives the impression that ISPs ought never be held liable for harms
done to third parties. That judgment is overbroad and premature.

the head by a flowerpot thrown from a tenth-story window, and A knew that B was unaware of the
impending catastrophe and also knew that he could save B with a shout, yet he did nothing and as a result B
was killed, still, A’s inaction, though gratuitous (there was no risk or other nontrivial cost to A) and even
reprehensible, would not be actionable.”).
80
For some insight into where to draw the line, see id. at 481 (reasons not to compel rescues and other
magnanimous behaviors include: “the circle of potentially liable nonrescuers would be difficult to draw
(suppose a person is drowning and no one on the crowded beach makes an effort to save him—should all
be liable?); altruism makes the problem a small one and liability might actually reduce the number of
altruistic rescues by depriving people of credit for altruism . . .; people would be deterred by threat of
liability from putting themselves in a position where they might be called upon to attempt a rescue,
especially since a failed rescue might under settled common law principles give rise to liability, on the
theory that a clumsy rescue attempt may have interfered with a competent rescue by someone else”).
81
See, for example, Fonovisa, supra note 23.

40

IV. Conclusion
Controversies over indirect liability have been prominent in recent years, sparked
in no small measure by questions over who, if anyone, should be held liable for the
rampant copyright infringement that as of this writing continues to be a significant
feature of life online. With that in mind, we conclude with some remarks about how our
comments on cyber-security relate to that other debate, along the way clarifying the outer
limits of our position and also suggesting areas for further research.
At the outset, it must be noted that, on its own terms, indirect liability knows few
bounds, and thus there is almost always an argument to bring yet another entity into the
chain of liability. In the copyright wars, for example, the first round of litigation was
against the websites that facilitate infringement by offering services that directly or
indirectly match would-be music uploaders with would-be music downloaders.82 The
battle soon expanded to ensnare the venture capital firms that fund those entities,83 and
even the Internet service providers who provide the infrastructure over which music
piracy takes place.84 In our setting, one could quite similarly talk about imposing liability
on Microsoft, the theory being that the vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system
are akin to the design defects actionable in products liability law, or Dell, for the roll its
nearly ubiquitous computer systems play in the struggle for cyber-security.
Extending liability in this way would not necessarily be unwise. Microsoft, for
example, surely can design its initial software to be less vulnerable to Internet
misbehavior. This is simply a matter of investing more resources in product design as
well as testing. Microsoft could also redesign its software such that customers would be
required to download patches when necessary, perhaps under the threat that the software
will stop working if the latest patch is not downloaded within a specified period. This
82
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challenging this interpretation of the law. See 17 U.S.C. §512(h), construed in RIAA v. Verizon Internet
Servs., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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would be a minimally intrusive way to ensure that users keep their anti-virus precautions
up to date—a bit like mandatory vaccinations for school children. Further, even if
Microsoft cannot take additional precautions, we pointed out earlier that the price
increase that would result from an increase in liability would itself have some policy
allure in that the resulting price would better reflect the relative value of the Windows
operating system as compared to competing alternatives like Mac OS.
All that said, however, as a practical matter the chain of liability cannot extend
forever, and thus in the end choices must be made as to which entities are best positioned
to support enforcement of the law. The right thought experiment is to imagine that all the
relevant entities and all the victims and all the bad actors can efficiently contract one to
another, and then ask how the parties would in that situation allocate responsibility for
detecting and deterring bad acts. Our firm suspicion in the cyber-security arena is that
ISPs would in that negotiation end up with significant responsibilities for policing
Internet activity; but that might not be true in the copyright setting, and it is certainly a
conclusion that might change if there are radical changes in the abilities of other entities
to prevent and deter bad acts.
Another distinction between the literature on copyright infringement and our own
inquiry regarding cyber-security comes in understanding the direction of the externality
imposed. The possibility of copyright infringement increases the average subscriber’s
willingness to pay for broadband Internet service. In many ways, music piracy is the
“killer app” that is today driving the deployment of broadband Internet service to the
home. Infringement is therefore an externality that attracts new subscribers to Internet
services, and as such there is a silver lining to the bad act of copyright infringement. The
opposite is true, however, for worms and viruses, each of which imposes a cost on the
average user and thus reduces the incentive to subscribe. This leads to two conflicting
implications. One is that policymakers should on this theory be marginally more
interested in imposing liability for cyber-insecurity than they are in imposing liability for
music piracy; in essence, the former is a barrier to broadband deployment while the latter
is a camouflaged subsidy. The other is that legal rules might at the same time be less
necessary, as ISPs already have a strong incentive to improve cyber-security (subscribers
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favor it) whereas ISPs have no similar incentive when it comes to fighting copyright
infringement.
Another important distinction is that the copyright dispute is in many ways a
dispute about the propriety of the underlying property right, rather than a dispute about
the proper contours of indirect liability per se. Many of those who oppose liability in the
copyright setting also question, in a more fundamental way, the scope and duration of
federal copyright grants. That radically alters the nature of the debate as compared to our
setting, where there is widespread agreement that worms, viruses, and denial of service
attacks are rightly deemed illegal and the real question comes only in determining how
best to discourage these counterproductive behaviors.
Finally, the copyright dispute is one where there are a variety of plausible legal
responses, and thus policymakers must tread carefully as they try to determine which
approach offers the best balance in terms of costs and effectiveness. Is the best approach
to facilitate lawsuits against the specific individuals who upload and download music?85
Would it be better to recognize indirect liability as a supplement to direct liability or even
a substitute for it?86 What about the idea of rejecting legal responses entirely and
encouraging instead self-help techniques like more effective encryption of digital
content?87 These are plausible questions in the copyright setting; parallel questions in the
context of cyber-security, however, ring hollow. That is, as we have already emphasized,
holding individuals directly responsible for worms and viruses is all but impossible in the
cyber-security setting given that individual bad actors are almost impossible to track, and,
even when identified, they usually lack the resources necessary to pay for the damage
85

Some commentators believe so and argue that copyright law should reject indirect liability and instead
focus on procedural reforms that would make direct lawsuits less costly. See, for example, Lemley &
Reese, cited in note 83. The challenge for these commentators comes in squaring their argument with the
real world empirical data: thousands of lawsuits have been filed, and yet illegal file swapping continues,
largely undeterred.
86
For discussion, see Lichtman & Landes, cited in note 18.
87
For one effort along these lines, see Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 18 FCC Rcd. 20885 (2003) (requiring hardware manufacturers to cooperate with efforts to encrypt
digital content distributed via cable and broadcast television). Interestingly, the possibility of self-help has
posed a significant challenge to the federal government’s efforts to control the online distribution of
offensive material that is inappropriate for minors. The problem? The Supreme Court seems to think that
filters installed by home users can be so effective that they render more heavy-handed restrictions on
speech—like the Child Online Protection Act—unconstitutional. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 2004 WL
1439998 (U.S., June 29, 2004).
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they cause. And, as we have also pointed out, while self-help techniques like firewalls
and anti-virus software do have a role to play in improving cyber-security, it is hard to
imagine that these sorts of precautions can be a sufficient response to the problem, let
alone a response that is so attractive as to justify blanket immunity for ISPs. The viability
of alternative legal strategies is thus a final important distinction to draw between these
two settings. The existence of such strategies should give pause to advocates and critics
alike in the copyright debates, but they seem significantly less salient when it comes to
the question of whether ISPs should be liable for their role in creating and propagating
malicious Internet code.
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